12 DAYS IN MAY 1941 - THE BATTLE OF CRETE
IAN McG. WYLIE Q.C.*
By the end of 1940 World War II was 16 months old. France had fallen to Germany and Italy had joined in the War in June 1940. Great Britain and its empire stood alone against the Axis partners and would do so for another 18 months. The swastika flew over much of central and western Europe, although the Battle of Britain had been won by late summer of that year. Germany had abandoned operation Sea Lion, its planned invasion of Britain, as early as 19 September 1940.
German attention had turned eastward. Drang nach Osten offered control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, even of the Iraqi and Persian oilfields; the Suez Canal would open the road to India. To that end, German armies entered Hungary and, in October 1940, took control of Rumania and, by winter, were preparing to invade Bulgaria. Italian participation in the War offered it the chance to enter Egypt from Libya and form the second arm of a pincer in a joint drive to the Suez Canal and ultimately the Persian Gulf, while eliminating the British and Imperial armies in North Africa.
On March 27, 1941 Hitler announced the decision to liquidate Yugoslavia. He had decided also to attack Greece at the same time. His object was that of "driving the British from the Balkans and laying the foundations for German air operations in the eastern part of the Mediterranean". The German strategy may be understood as an attempt to secure control of the southern flank of her planned invasion of Russia and to prevent British forces using the Balkans as a base to drive northwards to the oilfields of Ploesti in Rumania.
A swift German spring campaign in the Balkans was planned so that Germany could start its own air operations in the eastern Mediterranean. In the meantime Britain needed time to reinforce its Imperial forces in the Middle East. It did not get that time.
Italy had annexed Albania in Spring 1939 and so could directly invade Greece. Mussolini saw Greece as easy prey and believed the dictatorial regime of its Prime Minister, General Metaxas, did not have majority support from the population. He overlooked Greek patriotism when he concluded that Greece offered no serious opposition.
On 29 October 1940 the Italian Minister delivered to General Metaxas an ultimatum which accused Greece, a neutral thus far in the War, of having allowed the British fleet use of its territorial waters, of having facilitated refuelling of British aircraft, of allowing the British Intelligence Service to establish itself on Greek islands, and of allowing Greece to be "transformed into a base for warlike operations against Italy"; and demanded the immediate right to unimpeded occupation of unspecified strategic areas of Greece for the duration of the war against Britain as a defensive measure.
The ultimatum was rejected. Italian troops outnumbered Greek troops on the border by four to one. The Greeks had no tanks and few aircraft yet were able to repel the Italian invaders and themselves occupied much of Albania. By March 1941 the Italians had given up. That winter campaign left the Greek Army in need of recuperation and re-equipment. There was no time for either.
In April 1939 Britain had promised Greece assistance against aggression but, when the need arose, its resources with which to do so were limited. Britain's dilemma was how to offer Greece assistance against Italy while not so antagonising Germany as to invite her to invade Greece. On 8 January 1941 the British Chiefs of Staff concluded that, should Germany invade Greece, no effective resistance could be offered and that, as a military problem alone, there was no justification for sending men and aircraft into Greece. Hitler had given the order for the invasion of Greece on 13 December 1940. The German attack was expected in March 1941.
The British War Cabinet's policy from February was that Middle East Command should send Greece all troops and aircraft that could be spared. By the end of March, over 30,000 troops had arrived.
It is not my purpose to chronicle the drama of the German invasion, which commenced on 6 April 1941 at 5.45 am when the formal declaration of war was made by Germany and German armies crossed the frontier of Greece and Bulgaria. Other German armies entered from Yugoslavia on 9 April. On 13 April the Greeks departed from Albania: the Italians did not stir. On 9 April Salonika was occupied by the Germans. On 15 April the commanders of the three Imperial forces in the Middle East decided to prepare for evacuation from the mainland. On 17 April the Greek Minister for War declared further resistance impossible and gave a free hand to the Greek Generals to do as they thought fit in the face of the Germans' strength.
On 19 April 1941, General Wavell was instructed by Mr Churchill that the Imperial forces would only leave Greece with the approval of its King and government. That approval was given. On 21 April the commander of the Greek Army of Epirus surrendered to the Germans. On 27 April - three weeks after the invasion had begun - German troops entered Athens. The swaztika now flew over the Acropolis.
PREPARATION TO DEFEND CRETE
The evacuation from Greece left Crete as the only Allied outpost in the eastern Mediterranean. The island remained of strategic importance both to Britain and Germany. In German hands it would threaten the Navy's access to the Aegean Sea and permit Germany to conduct further operations into the Middle East should it wish. At the commencement of the war with Italy, the Greek government informed Britain that it would welcome the presence of British troops in Crete. The Navy wished to develop Souda Bay as a refuelling facility and did so. In November 1940 British troops arrived to defend the refuelling base and, generally, to assist the Greeks to prevent or defeat any invasion of the island.
Organising an effective defence of Crete was difficult. Its only major road ran along its north coast and so faced Greece. The road was narrow and many of its bridges were unable to carry heavy traffic. There was no railway on the island. Ports on the north coast had limited facilities for the discharge of cargo or of troops. Hania could only discharge ships by lighter. Retimo could only discharge one ship at a time, again by lighter. At Souda Bay two ships could be unloaded at the same time using the jetty. The only aerodrome, at Heraklion, had a concrete runway 1000 yards long but no hangers. As at 10 November 1940 coastal and antiaircraft defences were being organised and a new aerodrome was being constructed at Maleme 10 miles west of Hania.
Greece wanted Britain to be responsible for the defence of Crete so that its troops could be used against Italy in Albania. Britain reluctantly agreed although the British Chiefs of Staff considered that, were the mainland overrun, the retention of Crete would depend on the strength of its defence against attack by aircraft. A battalion of the Black Watch and the Middle East Commando replaced the departing Greek troops. Given the various demands upon resources by all areas under General Wavell's command and the fact that at the time Crete was remote from the front line, no more infantry could be provided.
The immediate object was to plan the camps and installations one army division might need. The consequence was that, until May 1941, Crete remained a refuelling base for the Navy and a transit base for the Army and Air Force; a third aerodrome was constructed at Retimo and construction of a fourth began at Kastelli but abandoned as there were neither aircraft to use it nor guns to defend it. Flying boat bases in Souda Bay and the Gulf of Mirabella were unsuitable for night use and dangerous in bad weather. Fighters were restricted to the aerodromes at Maleme, Hania and Retimo. None could come from Egypt, 400 miles away. An attempt to do so using Hurricanes fitted with extra fuel tanks was unsuccessful.
It did not help that from 6 November 1940 until 29 March 1940 six officers held the command. Then Major-General Weston R.M. took over. He recommended that 16,000 Italian prisoners of war held by Greece be removed.
Plans for the defence of Crete were subsequently disrupted by the decision to use Crete as a transit camp for Allied troops evacuated from Greece in order to achieve a quick turnover by the ships being used for the evacuation. Ultimately few of those who arrived were moved off the island because of the lack of ships to do so.
On 25 April 1941 Hitler had ordered the invasion of Crete and its completion within seven days. General Student's 11th Air Corps of 22,000 paratroopers and glider borne infantry would carry out the invasion supported by 1,000 aircraft operating from Peleponnese. On 29 April the Germans entered Kalamata and took some 7,000 troops prisoner. The Germans now occupied the whole of the mainland of Greece and many of its islands.
On 30 April, as the last of the Imperial troops were about to be evacuated from the Peleponnese, General Wavell visited Crete. His expectation was that Crete would soon be subject to attack by air and by sea and that no further air support could be provided. He appointed Major-General B.C. Freyberg V.C. as the Commander of the forces in Crete. Freyberg had only arrived a day earlier on his way to Egypt from the Peleponnese. He eventually had under his command 28,614 Imperial troops and about 16,000 Greeks. Many of the Greeks were untrained and unarmed. Just under 20,000 Imperial troops had been evacuated to Crete from Greece and had remained there. He had nine heavy tanks, 23 light tanks, 68 anti-aircraft guns and 36 aircraft, many unserviceable. The Italian prisoners of war were still on the island and, although the officers were later moved to Egypt, most who remained were later freed by the victorious Germans.
On 28 April, Prime Minister Churchill had ordered General Wavell, "The island must be stubbornly defended". On 5 May Freyberg advised Churchill:
"am not in the least anxious about airborne attack, combination of seaborne and airborne attack is different."
German air raids on Crete began immediately. They concentrated on ships approaching or anchored off the island. At Souda Bay by 19 May there were 13 sunk, damaged or partly submerged ships and more than half of the guns and stores sent between 1 May and 20 May was sunk while en route or in the harbour. It became necessary to bring in supplies at night in the fastest Navy warships. On 13 May the main targets became the aerodromes and antiaircraft guns. The British fighters, some obsolete and some damaged, shot down over 23 German aircraft and nine "probables" and damaged 11 others. By 19 May there were only six British fighters left so they were flown to Egypt. The aerodromes were to be rendered unsuitable for use by German aircraft. That order could not be carried out before the invasion took place. But the Germans had also encountered logistic problems and the date originally chosen (15 May) had passed.
DAY ONE: 20 MAY 1941
On 18 May two German pilots were rescued from the sea after baling out of their aircraft. They told their Cretan rescuers that the German invasion of Crete would occur soon after dawn on 20 May. That information was given to Major General Freyberg but not passed on to the defenders of Crete. The consequence was that when, on Tuesday 20 May at 6.30 am, German bombers, dive bombers and fighters arrived overhead, the defenders assumed that this was just as had occurred for the previous week and took to their trenches.
After an hour had passed and the bombardment had not diminished, headquarters at Souda decided that it was 'the real thing", and Operations Room warned all anti-aircraft gun positions. Hindsight demonstrated the accuracy of the information fortuitously gained 48 hours earlier but it remains difficult to argue that the outcome on 20 May would have been any different or that better preparation could have been achieved in those remaining hours.
German transport planes and gliders approached the western end of Crete and then approached Maleme and Hania from the landward side. A formidable airborne landing was about to begin around Maleme airport, to the west and south of Hania and on the Akrotiri Peninsula, the northern side of Souda Bay.
Maleme
Most of the defence artillery on the edge of the airfield was positioned in the expectation that the attack would come from the sea. At about 8 am the first German gliders landed in the dry bed of the Tavronitis River to the west of the aerodrome. The soldiers aboard were able to gather out of the defenders' sight yet near the aerodrome. Twenty minutes later parachutists arrived, some 500 to the west, others about 1,000 yards south of the aerodrome, and some to its southwest.
Some landed in Maleme village and soldiers of New Zealand's 22nd Battalion and Cretan civilians were able to kill most of those. To the east some 600 parachutists of the German Assault Regiment were dropped in the mistaken belief that the foothills south of the coastal road were undefended. In fact, they landed in positions prepared by the 22nd and 23rd Battalions. Many were killed or wounded and most of the containers of stores fell into New Zealand laps. Although a few Germans were able to fight their way and join the main body in the Tavronitis river-bed, that German unit was completely destroyed.
By mid morning the Germans who had landed and banded together were preparing to go on the offensive, supported by the mortars and guns which had been dropped. After the parachute landings, troop carriers landed on the beaches near Maleme and a German battalion landed at Kolimvaria on the coast two miles west of the Tavronitis and set off for Kastelli. Its only opposition was a group of Cretan guerillas. One platoon which had landed further west was wiped out. The Germans reached a high pass five miles further along that road by evening.
During that afternoon as more troop carriers arrived, the Germans gained control of the ridge south of Maleme. Shortly after 5 pm 40 New Zealanders counterattacked to the west of the airfield supported by two tanks which experienced mechanical failures and withdrew. The attackers were forced to withdraw across the aerodrome. All except three were wounded. At 9 pm the companies of the New Zealand's 22nd Battalion withdrew to the southeast into line with the 21st Battalion holding an inland area and the 23rd Battalion holding a line from Pirgos to the coast. About midnight a company of the 28th Battalion reached the aerodrome, found no New Zealanders there, and withdrew to its original position, killing about 50 German paratroopers while doing so. A company of the 22nd Battalion which had been out of contact for several hours finally made its way back. A second was captured the next morning. A third moved into the mountains and eventually to the south coast.
The aerodrome had not effectively been in the defenders' control since that morning and its evacuation by the 22nd Battalion has been described as "probably the decisive single step in the battle for Crete."
Hania and Souda
This operation commenced disastrously for the Germans when the glider carrying the commander of the group carrying out the invasion of this area, and his staff, crashed on the island of Aegina, killing all passengers.
The area west and southwest of Hania, defended by the New Zealand 4th Brigade was bombed for an hour from 7 am and paratroops began landing at about 9.15 am on the western side of the town. The aerial bombardment hit a large ammunition dump.
The principal military hospital for western Crete consisted of large tents holding 500 persons and was full with those wounded in earlier bombings and also held a few German airmen. It stood on the coast two miles west of the town and near the road to Maleme. In that morning's bombing some tents were set alight by bombs or torn by machine gun fire.
A company of parachutists then landed in the grounds and took all (but one who was shot) prisoner. About noon the paratroopers set off southwards to join a battalion dropped east of Galatas, about a mile away. About 300 walking wounded prisoners accompanied them. They could not locate those other paratroopers. Later, while they were resting, the party was discovered by a New Zealand patrol, which opened fire on it. A fight ensued. Taking care for the safety of the prisoners, and helped by Greek troops from the rear, all save two paratroopers were killed. The wounded prisoners were taken to the area held by the New Zealand 19th Battalion. New Zealanders then recaptured the hospital. It was estimated the German losses in this area were about 200.
Fighting took place through the day around Galatas and along the road from Hania to Alikianou. Late that afternoon a company from the New Zealand 18th Battalion and three light tanks of the 3rd Hussars attacked the small village of Galaria, a German stronghold. They were beaten off but the Germans also withdrew to the southwest to join the main body to join the main body of the 3rd Parachute Regiment on either side of the road to Alikianou. The paratroopers who had been dropped in that valley had been widely dispersed and about 200 were killed. Two Greek battalions and Cretan citizens repulsed a German attack on the village and bridge of Alikianou and indeed until the night of 25 May were able to prevent a German flanking movement south of Hania.
German paratroops were able to advance within three miles of Souda to be checked by troops of No 6 Greek Regiment.
There had been glider landings south of Hania and on the Akrotiri Peninsula for the purpose of destroying anti-aircraft batteries and the wireless transmitting station. The gun battery had been captured for a time before a successful counterattacks survived from three companies.
Another two companies of paratroopers were dropped on the Peninsula to destroy allied guns and four of 15 gliders had fallen into the sea; the guns were not in the expected position; the Germans had little chance against the defenders.
The attack on the area around Hania was in general a failure. At the end of the day the only concentration of Germans - four miles southwest of the town - was not in a position to consider an offensive.
Retimo
A narrow coastal strip containing the main road was backed by a series of terraced ridges. Olive groves and vineyards on that strip and the seaward sides of the ridges provided cover for any troops on the ground. The aerodrome next to the coast was five miles east of the town and guarded by two battalions of the Australian 19th Brigade and some Greek troops. Another two battalions of that Brigade (commanded by Brigadier G.A. Vasey) were covering the beach at Georgeopolis in case a landing by sea was attempted. Most of the field and machine guns were on the hills but ammunition was scarce. 2,300 Greek soldiers (4 battalions) had only a handful of ammunition each and were inexperienced.
The Germans planned to capture the town and aerodrome and then move towards Hania.
German bombers arrived at 3.45 pm but did little damage. Thirty minutes later the first of four flights each of about 25 troop-carrying aeroplanes arrived. The defenders were expecting them and, with small arms, were able to shoot down four carriers and kill or wound many paratroops as they descended. About 1,200 paratroops landed around the aerodrome. They cut communication with the defence headquarters at Georgeopolis and also the coastal road.
The Australians suffered 40 serious casualties. Some 400 Germans proceeded to Perivola - more than two miles east of the town - and sought to move further to the east during the night. An attempt to penetrate into the town was driven off by Cretan police. On the eastern front most of the paratroops were overwhelmed by the Australians and Greeks.
As there had been no attack on Georgeopolis during that day the Australian 2/8 Battalion was despatched that evening to Hania.
In this sector the balance of the fighting favoured the defenders.
Heraklion
The defence of this town and aerodrome was in the hands of a well-equipped and fresh body of men consisting of the original British garrison, the Australian 2/4 Battalion and two Greek battalions. A platoon of the Black Watch manned a roadblock at Knossos across the road inland. The aerodrome was well covered by guns. This was a formidable concentration of troops and guns.
The German attack happened two hours later than was intended. Preliminary bombing commenced at 4 pm and continued until 5 pm. The anti-aircraft guns stayed silent during that hour. Then the first German troop carriers appeared. The guns began firing. Estimates of the number of aircraft shot down are of somewhere in the 150 to 200 range. Apart from the men in those aircraft, a large number of parachutists were killed as they descended.
A counterattack was launched before the paratroopers had time to establish themselves on the ground and in which German aeroplanes could not effectively intervene. The aerodrome was quickly cleared of the battalion of German paratroopers that had landed there. Fewer than 100 Germans survived. As things were going badly for the Germans, at about 7.20 pm a second bomber attack arrived. It was followed by further paratroopers who landed well to the east of the defence line. They arrived at the aerodrome near midnight only to encounter resistance.
In the meantime, Germans had entered the town from its west and south and it took them from dusk until after 10 pm to make their way to the harbour against opposition.
Review of danger
The Germans had sent some 8,000 paratroopers against about 25,000 British and Imperial troops and 11,000 Greeks. They had sustained heavy losses. At Maleme more than 2,000 paratroopers had been dropped, with heavy loss. The aerodrome had not been captured. The invaders had forced the defenders to its eastern edge but they were only at its western edge. At Hania about 2,000 paratroopers had been dropped, again with heavy losses. The attack on the town had failed and had been discontinued.
Only along the Alikianou road there were a number of German troops. At Retimo 1,200 paratroopers had been dropped and about half had been lost. The remainder was divided into two groups and the eastern group was in a position to threaten the aerodrome which had still to be taken. Almost the entire force of Australians and Greeks was between those groups. At Heraklion, of 2,000 paratroopers half had been lost. The aerodrome had not been captured. While some Germans had entered the town, others were on the defensive south of the aerodrome. Others had established themselves further east.
According to German figures seven of over 500 aircraft used in that morning's operations were lost but a number of others had crashed on returning to base.
Germany had to send further troops and capture at least one aerodrome or prepare an alternative. It was decided to send the 5th Mountain Division to Maleme.
So far as the defenders were concerned, they required more ammunition (which would have to be shipped in at night), they had inadequate wireless equipment, telephone lines had been destroyed or cut by the Germans and no vehicles could be spared to convey messages between the four sectors and within them.
DAY TWO : 21 MAY 1941
The King departs
George, King of the Hellenes, and members of his government, had flown from Athens to Souda Bay on 23 April 1941, the surrender of the Greek Army of Epirus having been formally concluded and the British having decided to evacuate mainland Greece. He had, on the previous day announced his determination to fight to the finish. An anglophile, he was denounced in Hitler's speech on 4 May at the end of the campaign in Greece.
In Crete the King and his entourage lived in a village outside Hania. That he might be taken hostage was realised. It was decided that he move to his Prime Minister's residence a mile or so away. He did so on May 19. It happened that, on the morning of May 20, a company of paratroopers were wrongly dropped in the village the King had left the day before. It was decided to move the King out of the battleground and into the mountains of central Crete. By 9.30 am the royal party had started its journey protected by a New Zealand platoon. The journey had its dangers of detection. That night, the party had after climbing all day only reached Therisson, a village only some eight miles in a direct line from Hania.
The following night the party was close to the crest of the central range. Its members slept in the cold open air. Next afternoon the party reached the village of Samaria in the foothills where a message awaited that a party of British officials was waiting for them at the coastal village of Agia Roumeli, only a few miles away. The royal party resumed its journey walking down a narrow gorge and often in the waters of the stream which ran down to the sea. Conference delegates who visit the now world famous Samaria Gorge on Saturday 29 May 2004 next will be able to replicate that part of the royal trek.
That evening, for several hours, SOS signals were sent from the shore in the hope that a friendly ship at sea might answer. At 1 am an answering signal came but the ship came no closer to the shore. Two British officials went out in a fishing vessel to find out if the ship was friendly. It was HMS Decoy. The party boarded her and the warship sailed to Alexandria in Egypt.
Maleme
Dawn on 21 May brought a German air attack searching, unsuccessfully, for the positions of the defender's guns. Then just after 9 am about 60 transport aircraft arrived and dropped about 500 paratroopers on to the enemy positions west of the aerodrome. At the same time other Germans renewed their attack on the aerodrome. With the help of aircraft they were able to drive off the opposition.
When the troop carriers arrived they landed on the aerodrome and quickly unloaded troops and their armaments before taking off again. German fighters were overhead and, throughout this day, they attacked the New Zealander's positions near the aerodrome and further east. Although short of ammunition because the German bombers had destroyed a number of ammunition dumps, the New Zealand gunners were able to set fire to some aircraft while they were on ground and inflict heavy loss on the German troops. By day's end most of the German 5th Mountain Division had been landed at the aerodrome, on the back and on the bed of the Tavronitis River and immediately joined in the battle. Many German paratroops were dropped amongst New Zealanders and immediately killed captured.
By capturing and using the coloured symbols which the Germans on the ground used to signal their supply requirements, the defenders were able to obtain some much needed material.
General Freyberg realised that the Germans could not be allowed to continue to land troops at Maleme. Given gun dominance in the air, any counterattack had to take place that night.
Elsewhere on Crete
Attacks by German bombers and fighters continued. British troops continued to mop up the survivors of the airborne landings on Akrotiri Peninsula. Four hundred Australians of the 2/18th battalion arrived from Georgeopolis with about 200 Australian gunners armed as infantrymen to reinforce the defence of Hania.
Invasion by sea prevented
On 20 May, Royal navy vessels were deployed to protect Crete against a seaborne invasion. Twenty-one cruisers and destroyers were spread from west to east along its north coast. There was no fighter protection available. Throughout 21 May the vessels were repeatedly bombed by German aircraft. Juno was sunk and Ajax damaged by near misses.
The Germans planned a seaborne landing during the night of 21 May. Just before midnight the squadron patrolling the western half of Crete's northern coast found the invasion fleet, 18 miles away from the island. It consisted of small steamers and caiques escorted by an Italian torpedo-boat. The escort was damaged by gunfire but not sunk. British destroyers then destroyed and sank most of the invasion fleet. At 8.30 am next morning, six cruisers and four destroyers came across more of the invasion fleet, sank a small vessel and a caique and hit a torpedo boat which withdrew making smoke which concealed the caiques she was escorting.
The Navy did not chase the enemy ships as they retreated towards the island of Milos. That was the end of Germany's attempt to invade Crete by sea. It is believed that 2,000 to 4,000 Germans were killed or drowned. The Navy had to stay at sea lest another seaborne invasion occurred. German aircraft over the following days extracted revenge. These ships were sunk on 22 May: Greyhound, Gloucester, Fiji, Naiad was seriously damaged and Warspite, Valiant and Carlisle near hit. On 23 May the destroyers Kashmir and Kelly (Lord Louis Mountbatten, Captain) were sunk. It was not practicable for the Navy to continue to operate north of Crete by day. The fleet on 24 May withdrew to Alexandra. The Army was now the sole fighting force left in action.
DAY 3, 22 MAY 1941
Maleme
Before dawn the counterattack planned to expel the Germans from the aerodrome and the nearby area began. If the aerodrome and its surrounding area were lost so too would Crete be lost. There were problems from the beginning. The Australian 2/7 Battalion had been delayed in moving westward. Only two companies had arrived in the area between Hania and Platanius by 1 am. It was decided that the New Zealand 20th Battalion would move forward along the coastal road company by company as the Australians arrived. It was not until 3.30 am that all the New Zealanders were advancing towards their objective, the aerodrome and the high ground south of it.
As the New Zealanders moved westwards German resistance increased and progress slowed. Near dawn the New Zealanders were near the village of Maleme which was occupied by Germans. Three British tanks were withdrawn from the battle, one because it had been disabled by artillery fire and two others because their guns had jammed. One of those tanks was then lost in a German air raid. The right of the New Zealand troops halted on the beach on the edge of the aerodrome, the left of the battalion engaged in hand to hand fighting and the Maoris reached the near end of ridges to the south of the aerodrome. The New Zealand troops had done well so far.
Daylight low-level air attacks on the New Zealanders showed that neither the aerodrome nor the village could be taken. The forward positions could not be defended against air attacks nor could a heavy artillery barrage be directed against the village. New Zealand troops on the coastal plain were withdrawn to the higher ground to the south. They sustained a severe casualty rate.
The Germans then began to fly in to the aerodrome, in planeloads of up to 40 armed soldiers each, three battalions, a parachute artillery unit, and a field hospital. While the landing ground was still within range of the defenders' field guns and several of the transport planes crashed on landing, the new German troops which arrived that afternoon were soon organised into three battle groups. One was to protect Maleme from any attack from the south and the west. The second was to start an encircling movement to the south. The third was to develop an attack to the east, towards Hania.
The first group referred to above began to move to the west to clear the way to Kastelli. It met resistance from a Greek regiment and from Cretan guerrillas and Kastelli was not captured until the morning of 26 May.
During the afternoon of 22 May the New Zealand 21st Battalion and the Maoris counterattacked south of Pirgos which the Germans had penetrated. At 5pm General Freyberg wished to order another counterattack, considering that evening was the last chance to save Maleme and Crete. He was however persuaded by his commanders; (i) that a German force was threatening an attack towards Galatus and should be dealt with first since, if it succeeded, communication between two New Zealand brigades would be endangered, and (ii) that the men of the 5th Brigade were tired from the previous night's and that day's fighting and were unfit to mount an immediate attack. It was decided to withdraw that Brigade to a position to the rear of Platanius and to move the Maori Battalion forward towards Maleme while the other battalions moved to the east both to prevent the Germans at Maleme joining up with those west of Hania or to withdraw to Hania. However it was not until after midnight that movement began.
Meanwhile the threatened German attack upon Galatus began at sunset. It was stopped after a gain of 500 yards. Stalemate followed.
Hania
To defend the town, a defensive line was established from the north-west to the south-east and was manned by the 4th and 5th New Zealand Brigades, a combined force of Greeks and New Zealanders and the Australian 19th Brigade. It was decided to move civilians from the town of Hania to villages in the hills to the south since the town had often been bombed. Most left that night.
Retimo
In the morning the Australian 2/1st Battalion attacked, withdrew from, and recaptured Hill A to the east of the aerodrome. The Germans retreated to Stowromenos. Meanwhile the 2/11th captured Hill B, to the west of the aerodrome, with little trouble but could not proceed further because the Germans were well established at Platania on the coast. There was also relief when a flight of German bombers bombed German troops and other German aeroplanes dropped supplies to the Australians. A Greek battalion was able to reach a position which overlooked Perivolia near Retimo. In the afternoon the Australians cleared beaches between the two hills, A and B.
By the end of the day, the main German forces had been driven off both to the east and to the west. However the defenders were running out of ammunition and supplies and the Germans in Perivola had cut communication with Souda and the west.
Heraklion
On the morning of 22 May the town was fairly secure, the aerodrome was not threatened and the Germans who had been in the barracks to the south of the aerodrome had been eliminated. The Germans were however to the east of the town in considerable numbers.
All movements by defending troops were troubled by German air attacks and a troop carrier attempted to land at the aerodrome but it and its fighter escort were driven off by our guns. Throughout the day the Germans dropped supplies both inside the defence perimeter and outside it. The systematic burial of 1,250 dead Germans was carried out by British and Greek parties.
In the evening about 300 German paratroops landed to the west of the town and 500 landed to the southwest. Late that night a German force took up positions across the road south from the town.
DAYS 4, 5 AND 6: 23, 24 AND 25 MAY 1941
This is the period when German forces grew numerically and exerted growing pressure whilst the defenders' position weakened daily because of increasing problems of supply to and command of the four battle fronts. There practically was no relief and reinforcement for weary troops undergoing daily attacks from fresh German troops who kept arriving.
From the morning of 23 May Maleme was effectively in German hands as the New Zealanders withdrew to the east protected on their left by Brigadier G.A. Vasey's Australian 19th Brigade at Georgeopolis. On the same day a three hours long truce in the Retimo area enabled both Germans and Australians to bury the dead. At the end of that period Lieutenant-Colonel I.R. Campbell rejected the German demand for surrender. A bombardment of the German lines reopened combat but it could not be sustained. Ammunition was in short supply and had to be husbanded in order to keep the aerodrome protected. There was no direct communication with either Souda or Heraklion. Dwindling food supplies had to be shared with German prisoners. The defenders were alone. On 24 May a battalion quartermaster was sent to Force Headquarters to obtain information and supplies; he returned on 26 May with little of either.
On 23 May, at Heraklion, German aircraft dropped supplies and reinforcements. Two tanks from Timbaki, the one tank which had been operating in Heraklion and two field guns were sent by sea to Souda.
26 MAY 1941 ONWARDS
Retreat to Sphakia and evacuations
By 26 May some 3,000 fresh German troops were arriving daily and the Souda Bay sector was in danger of being surrounded. Threatened by four German regiments, the New Zealanders in Galatos were ordered to withdraw to the east of the Australians. Brigadier Vasey doubted that the Australian 2/7 and 2/8 Battalions could hold on. He had told General Freyberg that the Greeks were "about to break" although the Greeks and Cretan irregulars were resisting the Germans at Aliakianou. The Australians were ordered to withdraw.
On 26 May General Freyberg signalled General Wavell in Cairo -
"Our position is hopeless ... Provided a decision is reached at once a certain proportion of the force might be embarked."
On 27 May the evacuation of Crete was approved. The plan for the withdrawal of troops in the Maleme, Hania and Souda areas was put into operation. Major-General Weston R.M., who had conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the island in April 1941 and was in command of the defence of the Hania and Souda sectors, was entrusted with that withdrawal. German official accounts reveal that they expected the withdrawal to be to the east in order to join the troops at Retimo. Instead the troops withdrew southwards taking a narrow road through the mountains to the village of Sphakia on the south coast. A series of delaying actions were planned. On the night of 26 May 200 troops took up positions in the town and docks of Souda while a larger number proceeded to the next rearguard position near Silos. Hania and Souda were evacuated during that night. Coastal defence and anti-aircraft guns were destroyed.
The road to Sphakia ended two miles from the village. A walking track then led to the village. The precipitous last 500 yards led to a narrow strip of shingle 150 yards long at water's edge.
On 28 May Headquarters troops and R.A.F. wireless operators arrived. A wireless transmitter was set up in a cave a mile to the east. Troops arriving during daylight were taken to places of concealment and, after nightfall, moved to the beach, ready to depart.
On that night the Navy's focus was on the evacuation from Heraklion. It sent the destroyers Kandahar, Kelvin, Napier and Nizam to Sphakia and was able to evacuate 1,000 wounded and unwounded troops, including R.A.F. personnel.
For most of 28 May and the following night the Australian 19th Brigade and the New Zealand 5th Brigade walked south reaching Askifou and a large body of troops at about 3:00am. The pursuing Germans had taken the road to Retimo and it was well into the afternoon before other German troops appeared but were beaten off by the rear guard north of Askifou. There was very little air traffic but between 6 to 7 pm. 60 aeroplanes attacked Sphakia and the beaches. After resting most of 29 May, New Zealand troops commenced to move to the beaches.
At 10 pm the cruisers Calcutta, Coventry, H.M.A.S. Perth and Phoebe, the destroyers Hasty, Janus and Jarvis and the troopship Glengyle arrived off Sphakia. By 3 am on 30 May, 6,500 of the troops who had fought at Maleme and Hania had been ferried out to the ships, more than General Freyberg had anticipated might be evacuated. Next morning, German aircraft found and pursued the convoy for some hours but only Perth sustained damage and casualties when hit by a bomb. As Africa neared, long-range R.A.F. fighters escorted the convoy home.
There were still more than 10,000 troops in the Sphakia area. It had been planned to send four destroyers to complete the evacuation on the night of 30 May. Since that would have meant only 2,000 evacuees, Admiral Cunningham agreed to extend the evacuation by one more trip.
Brigadier Vasey, in command of the rearguard on the road to Sphakia, engaged two companies of a German Mountain Regiment throughout that day in a fighting retreat to the main Australian position on a ridge two hours walk from Sphakia, which was reached at 5 pm. The two tanks and the Brengun carriers were wrecked and used to reinforce roadblocks which were in position. Fortunately, the Germans did not press on. Rather it was decided that they would move into positions from which, on the next day, they could envelop the defenders.
During the day, two Sunderland flying-boats landed at Sphakia. In obedience to an order from Middle East Command, General Freyberg and his staff were flown to Africa leaving Major-General Weston R.M. in charge of the last stage of the evacuation. Freyberg and his New Zealand troops had endured the hardest fighting of the campaign in Greece and Crete. Freyberg had also been left in command of all British and Imperial troops remaining in mainland Greece on 27 April and was one of the last of 4,000 to embark from Monemvasia in the Peleponnese on 28 April for Crete.
During the day two German patrols had been able to make their way close to the defenders' headquarters (a cave). They were destroyed, one by a New Zealand platoon led by Second Lieutenant C.H. Upham whose gallantry resulted in the award of the Victoria Cross.
That night's evacuation was a disappointment. Only two (Napier and Nizam) of the planned four destroyers had been able to complete the voyage to Sphakia. By 3 am 1,400 troops had embarked. The two ships were bombed during the return voyage but not damaged.
31 MAY
On this morning, there were still 9,000 troops in the vicinity of Sphakia. The rearguard, consisting of Australians on either side of the road and New Zealanders on the right and left, represented a broad front which the German Commander decided not to attack. To enable a wider enveloping movement to be carried out on the next day, two more companies were called up to take up positions in the mountains one on each flank. The German plan was to descend upon Sphakia both from east and west, with air support. Meanwhile, Brigadier Vasey considered that his troops could hold their position throughout the day although there was an acute shortage of food and water.
Wireless contact with Middle East Command was only occasional. In the afternoon a signal from that Command advised General Weston that the final evacuation by ship would take place that night when, it was hoped, to embark 3,600 troops and that a couple of Sunderland flying boats would also be sent. Weston was instructed to leave on one of them. General Wavell's last order in that signal was -
"Please tell those that have to be left that the fight put up against such odds has won the admiration of us all and every effort to bring them back is being made. General Freyberg has told me how magnificently your Marines have fought and of your own grand work. I have heard also of the heroic fighting of young Greek soldiers. I send you my grateful thanks."
About 5,500 troops were not to be evacuated. Before leaving by air, General Weston issued this directive to Lieutenant-Colonel Colvin who was to remain on the island as senior officer -
"(a) My orders direct me to give preference to fighting troops. This has reduced the active garrison below what is required for resistance.
(b) No rations are left this Saturday night. Most of the troops are too weak owing to shortage of food and heavy strain to organise further resistance.
(c) The wireless will give out in a few hours and the risk of waiting for instructions from Middle East cannot be accepted, as this will leave the officer in charge without any guidance as to his course of action.
(d) There is no possibility of further evacuation. I therefore direct you to collect such senior officers as are available in the earlier hours of tomorrow morning and transmit these orders to the senior of them."
These orders direct those officers to contact with the enemy and to capitulate"
Colvin was also given one thousand pounds sterling to enable individual groups to purchase means of escape.
At 11 pm that night the cruiser Phoebe, the destroyers Hotspur, Jackal and Kimberley and a mine layer Abdiel arrived. They sailed at 3 am, carrying away 4,050 troops.
On his arrival in Alexandria, General Weston requested Middle East Command to drop sufficient food to the troops left behind to enable them to survive until they were captured and fed by the Germans. That was done.
1 JUNE
About 5,000 troops were left behind. Many continued to resist on that day as best they could.
Major Garrett R.M. found a landing craft, containing some rations, and with 138 others set off for an uninhabited island to the south just as German aircraft arrived to bomb Sphakia and the Australians remaining on the ridge north of that village. That evening they left that island for Africa 200 miles further south. After fuel ran out on the following evening the vessel drifted southward. On 9 June, 136 hungry and thirsty men reached Africa near Sidi Barrani which was under Allied control. There had been two deaths. Three other landing craft containing 136 soldiers also reached Africa. Other small parties, totalling in all over 400 soldiers, kept arriving in Africa until late September 1941.
Back in Sphakia on 1 June at 8.30 am the Germans commenced bombing the Allied positions around Sphakia. After a period of artillery bombardment, the planned German enveloping manoeuvre commenced. It took more than four hours for German troops to reach Sphakia and until 8 pm to establish control of some seven miles of cost on both sides of the village. The Battle of Crete was over. Crete now remembers fondly the soldiers from faraway lands whose bodies lie in its soil.
The Black Watch platoon near Knossos were not told of the Heraklion evacuation. The troops moved out and made their way to Ay Dheka, a few miles from the southern coast, where only a week before a company of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had been stationed for the protection of the Messara plain. Jointly, they moved to uninhabited coast near Timbaki on 30 May. On the next day after crossing the mountainous centre 100 Australians from the 2/11th Battalion at Retimo joined them. There were no Germans in that part of Crete. On 1 June a British bomber dropped a food supply to the party. An abandoned landing craft was found and 77 officers and soldiers set out for Africa. Early next day an Italian submarine stopped the craft, took nine officers prisoner, and then allowed the craft to proceed. Mersa Matruh was reached on 5 June.
As the Germans took control of the southern coast they seized all large vessels and their aircraft regularly patrolled the coastal edge. Further escape by sea became very difficult.
A number of Allied troops also made their way into the mountains and the Cretans sheltered them. It was estimated that some 500 Allied soldiers were still in Crete at the end of 1941.
Heraklion
During the night of 26 and 27 May Brigadier Chappel explained the position to Middle East Command as there was no direct communication with General Freyberg. The Heraklion perimeter, although exposed to German fire, could be defended but, should the Germans reinforce their numbers by air, the defenders' position would become untenable. Any attempt to clear roads to the west and the southeast would be pointless unless reinforcements and further supplies could be sent using those roads. And an attack upon the main body of Germans near the village of Elia to the southeast would be risky with only the troops presently available.
Middle East Command replied on 27 May. The defenders were to be evacuated. That reply was not immediately communicated to the troops. They were ordered to act aggressively as opportunity arose. From 8.30 am the Germans dropped reinforcements and supplies mainly to the east of the defenders and shelled our positions. German air attacks took place throughout the day. An allied convoy of trucks set out for the south but was held up by the Germans at Knossos. The 2/4th Australian Battalion and the Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders sent out patrols to investigate German activity at "Apex Hill" near Knossos. During the afternoon two Hurricanes flew in from Africa but one was damaged when attempting to take off from Retimo.
On 28 May Admiral Cunningham decided that the Heraklion garrison of five battalions and 24 guns would be evacuated during that night. Brigadier Chappel was informed of that decision by Middle East Command. Preparations for the evacuation then began. The Germans delivered a heavy air attack that afternoon and used about 70 troop carriers to drop troops to the east of the perimeter. The military hospital at Knossos was fired upon by the Germans. That hospital was virtually surrounded by Germans. Its occupants would have to be left behind and the platoon from the Black Watch manning a roadblock nearby was also left to look after itself.
The decision to evacuate Heraklion was none too soon. On the next day Italian troops from the Dodecanese landed in eastern Crete and, by arrangement with the Germans, commenced to occupy that part. And the Germans had been preparing an assault upon the aerodrome on the afternoon of 29 May.
The cruisers Ajax, Dido and Orion and the destroyers Decoy, Hereward, Hotspur, Imperial, Jackal and Kimberley left Alexandria at 6 am on 28 May. A fire on board Ajax at about 9 am led to her returning to Alexandria. At 11.30 am that night the remaining vessels arrived off Heraklion. They had to leave by 3.30 am the cruisers lay outside the harbour. The destroyers ferried troops out to the cruisers before taking their quota. Over 4,000 troops sailed for Alexandria at 3 am on 29 May.
The voyage soon encountered trouble. Firstly, Imperial's steering gear broke down. Her crew and troops were transferred to Hotspur and she was then sunk. Secondly, soon after the sun rose and the flotilla had entered the Caso Strait between Crete and Karpathos, German aircraft struck. Hereward was hit. She steered for the coast of Crete and ran aground. Most of those on board became prisoners of war. Damage to Decoy caused a reduction of speed. Dido was hit. In repeated attacks Orion (1,100 troops) was hit three times, killing 91 persons and wounding 275 others. Almost out of control, she struggled on. The German attacks then gradually ceased.
Shortly before midday, aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm appeared as an escort, but the damaged ships could not be used in further evacuation efforts.
Heraklion was the most satisfactory of the engagements in the Battle of Crete. On the opening day the defending garrison defeated the German airborne attack and then for eight days defended the aerodrome against increasing German numbers.
Retimo
Here Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell's concern was to re-establish contact with the outside world. On the night of 26 May pilots attempting to drop supplies were unable to do so because they could not locate the defenders' positions. There were no ground flares available.
On the morning of 27 May the attack on the Germans at Perivola (where communication to the west had been cut) was unsuccessful. Two tanks were damaged in the attempt, two companies of the Australian 2/11th Battalion were pinned down by German fire and air attack and could not retire until night came.
At 3 am on 28 May two Australian companies made their way into Perivalo, killed about 80 Germans, and withdrew.
During that night, a landing craft arrived from Souda with two days' supplies. Unfortunately, it had set out for Retimo the previous evening before a message from General Freyberg advising of the decision to evacuate was taken to the harbour at Souda. Only when the Command head quarters arrived at Sphakia on 28 May was it learned that the message had not been sent to Retimo. There were no means of communicating with Retimo. Middle East Command was asked to send an aeroplane to Retimo to drop a message instructing Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell to begin a retreat to the south to Plaka and to be there by dawn on 31 May to be evacuated. German prisoners were to be handed over to the Greeks. The message was sent on 29 May by a Hurricane fighter. There is no evidence that the message it dropped was ever found. A second Hurricane sent that evening with another message never returned to Africa. It might have been attacked by enemy aircraft or suffered some other mishap. On 29 May German motorcycle troops entered Retimo in the afternoon and made contact with the Germans at Perivola. During that night the four Greek battalions which had been between the two Australian battalions disappeared into the hills. That night signals were flashed seaward in the hope some British craft might see them but there were no British ships in the northern waters of Crete.
On the morning of 30 May German army trucks were seen on the road from Perivola to Retimo. As they could only have come from Hania, Campbell inferred that the defence of Hania had failed. He left one company of the 2/11th Battalion to fight a delaying action at Perivola but it was soon overcome. He withdrew the rest of his troops to an area near the aerodrome. W
hen he saw two tanks and several field guns accompanying the advancing Germans to the south to where the Greeks had been, and knowing that ammunition was short and that there were only rations for that day, Campbell decided to surrender and advised the commander of the other battalion (the 2/1st) to do the same. The senior officers of that battalion accepted that recommendation.
Of the 1,000 troops in the Retimo garrison on 20 May some 160 had been killed, 140 escaped in small groups and assisted by the Cretans eventually reached the south coast of the island, and the remaining 700 became prisoners of war. The defenders of Retimo, lacking anti-aircraft guns, had succeeded in denying its aerodrome to the Germans by driving them beyond mortar range of it. They kept them from it although short of ammunition and other supplies until they could do it no longer. Ten days of fighting did not end in their defeat. Rather, the Battle of Crete was lost elsewhere.
Part of the German column passed through Retimo and made its way to Heraklion arriving there on the afternoon of 30 May, almost a day and a half after that area had been abandoned to the invader. A detachment of motorcycle troops continued to the east. It met the Italian invaders on the Gulf of Mirabella that night. The invaders now held the northern coast of Crete.
STATISTICS
28,614 troops from Britain, Australia and New Zealand made up the Imperial garrison in Crete on the first day of the German invasion. A further 3,464 British troops were landed from Egypt after the invasion began. 14,967 (46.6%) were evacuated to Egypt at its end.
These figures were released by Middle East Command in November 1941:
Original Force |
Arrived from Greece |
Reinforcements |
Crete 20 May |
|
Britain |
5,200 |
6,399 |
3,464 |
15,063 |
Australia |
6,451 |
6,451 |
||
New Zealand |
7,100 |
7,100 |
||
28,614 |
The evacuees were from: Britain 7,774; Australia 3,332; New Zealand 2,541. That so many were evacuated was due to the magnificent work of the Royal Navy. Its losses were also grave. Three cruisers and six destroyers were sunk. One aircraft carrier, two battleships, two cruisers and one destroyer were so damaged as to be out of action for months. Nine cruisers and destroyers sustained less severe damage. Admiral Cunninham's Fleet lost also over 2,000 officers and seamen. It could no longer dominate the eastern Mediterranean.
The official German figures for the losses of its Army and Air Force were:
Killed |
Wounded |
Missing |
Total |
|
Officers |
169 |
143 |
56 |
368 |
Other Ranks |
1,802 |
2,451 |
1,832 |
6,085 |
Totals |
1,971 |
2,594 |
1,888 |
6,453 |
Colonel-General Student, who was commander of XI Air Corps, confirmed those figures when interrogated after World War II ended. Their accuracy is questionable. General Freyberg suggested that German losses were 17,000 including 6,000 drowned. General Wavell's figure was 12,000 to 15,000. The Australian War Graves Commission visited Crete in June 1945 and counted 4,000 German graves in the area of Maleme, Hania and Souda. About 1,700 of those were around Galatas. The lowest figures of 300 and 600 were for Retimo and Heraklion. The New Zealand estimate also allowed for those drowned when aircraft crashed into the sea and proceeded on the basis of two being wounded for each death. Whatever be the correct figure, the losses involved specialist soldiers. General Student, on interrogation, after the War, admitted that German losses in Crete "out of 20,000 men" led to rejection of a proposal to attack Cyprus and use that island for a paratroop attack on the Suez Canal. Airborne operations dropped out of German planning. The XI Air Corps fought as infantry for the rest of the War.
German air losses from 13 May, when Crete was first attacked, until the end of the battle were: 35 fighters, 19 bombers, 9 dive bombers, 80 transport aircraft, and 4 long range reconnaissance aircraft - 147 in all. More or less seriously damaged were: 17 fighters, 7 bombers, 9 dive - bombers, 39 transport planes and 1 coastal patrol aeroplane and 84 aeroplanes were damaged when they crash landed on return from a flight to Crete.
REVIEW
The quick loss of the Battle for Crete, following the loss of the equally unsuccessful defence of the mainland of Greece was a great disappointment at the time. British troops had been based on Crete for some six months preparing to defend it. The Germans had no great number of ships available to execute an invasion by sea. Even if the Italian fleet should venture into the eastern Mediterranean after its defeat off Cape Matapan on 28 March 1941, the British fleet was waiting to fight it again. An airborne attack was foreseen as the most probable course but such had never been attempted before. In early May Winston Churchill had roared defiance:
"We intend to defend to the death, without thought of retirement, both Crete and Tobruk ... Let there be no thought of cutting our losses."
Mention of Tobruk where the determined defenders had already withstood a direct attack suggested those in Crete would resist with equal success.
Crete was, however, taken after only 12 days fighting. Nearly half of the Imperial force was killed or taken prisoner and it was taken, albeit at substantial cost, both in men and aeroplanes, by an overwhelming airborne assault. The battle was not lost for want of skilled leadership on bravery of the soldiers on the ground or of the Navy at sea. German air power was the winner. Over 1,200 aircraft of all types were involved; bombing, strafing and transporting soldiers, arms and supplies. The defenders had virtually no air support. The Germans were always going to succeed. Crete was one more of a series of defensive actions and bruised the Germans. It proved that a united British Empire would fight and not meekly surrender territory to the Germans and their allies.
The case for resisting the invasion of Crete was put by Winston Churchill during debate in the British House of Commons on 10 June 1941:
"The choice was whether Crete should be defended without effective air support or should the Germans be permitted to occupy it without opposition ... very often it is a choice between two very terrible alternatives. Must you, if you cannot have this essential and desirable air support, yield important key points one after another?"
The further question arises as to what would happen if you allowed the enemy to advance or overrun without cost to himself the most precious and valuable strategic points. Suppose we had never gone to Greece and never attempted to defend Crete. Where would the Germans be now? Suppose we had simply resigned territory and strategic islands to them without a fight! Might they not ... already be masters of Syria and Iraq and preparing themselves for an advance into Persia
... It is not only a question of the time that is gained by fighting strongly even at a disadvantage for important points, but there is also this vitally important point of stubborn resistance to the will of the enemy...
... At any rate the decision to fight for Crete was taken with the full knowledge that air support would be at a minimum ... apart from the question of whether you have adequate supplies or not."
POSTSCRIPT: AXIS OCCUPATION
Following the occupation of Greece and its islands by the Germans in association with the Bulgarians in Macedonia and the Italians in Greece, Crete and the islands, the country became a backwater so far as Allied strategy was concerned. Almost 50,000 Cretans died during the Axis occupation as a large, active resistance movement provoked strong reprisals with mountain villages being destroyed and their occupants shot. Since Greece had imported much of its food, a British naval blockade and indifference by the occupiers resulted in much hardship to the Greek population. The British controlled an intelligence network in Athens. Gradually resistance groups emerged throughout the country. They were supplied with ammunitions and other supplies by the British Military Mission as the British liaison officers were called.
In autumn 1942 Middle East Command sought to conduct an operation in Greece to support the planned offensive by General Montgomery's Eighth Army in North Africa. The plan was to destroy a viaduct north of Athens, cutting the railway line for some weeks. A British party was dropped by parachute in September 1942. A force of about 150 Greeks was assembled. It successfully attacked and destroyed the railway viaduct at Gogopostamos on the night of 25 November 1942.
The object of guerrilla operations in June and July 1942 was to persuade the Germans that Greece was about to be invaded by the Allies when the real invasion was planned to occur in Sicily. The deception succeeded but the Greeks were also deceived and began to plan for the liberation.
Mussolini fell from power and Italy surrendered on 3 September 1943. About 15,000 Italian troops in Greece transferred allegiance to the Allies through the British Military Mission which, after American officers had joined it about that time, changed name to Allied Military Mission. That Mission sought to help the resistance movements prepare for the final operations leading up to the liberation of Greece. Small British and American parties were infiltrated into Greece both to harass the Germans who were withdrawing and to ensure an Allied presence after liberation. As it happened, an orderly liberation of mainland Greece occurred in mainland Greece in September 1944 as the Germans withdrew into Yugoslavia. However the Germans left small garrisons in Crete, Rhodes and other islands and they surrendered on 6 May 1945. World War II was over so far as Greece was concerned. Greece was about to experience five years of political and constitutional crisis. The civil war is another story.
* Judge of the District Court of Queensland
Copyright 2004. Greek Legal and Medical Conference