The Greek Conference - Crete, May 2004 Papers

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REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

LOANE SKENE 1

There is no one 'legal perspective' on 'reproductive rights'. Laws, like people's attitudes are diverse.

Consider the types of 'reproductive activity' that may - or may not - be the subject of state regulation.

As a woman, I can engage in the following activities:

And, in case you should think my account is gender-based, I might make similar observations - with a similar argument concerning the laws that do, or should, apply - in relation to my husband. If he wants to undergo a sterilization procedure like a vasectomy - or to have that procedure reversed, he can do so without complying with specific laws on sterilisation. Similarly, if he has other surgery to improve his chances of conceiving a child, there is no specific law on that. But if he needs to resort to donor sperm so that we can have a child, the same laws apply to us both, whether I have ordinary sexual relations with the donor or inseminate myself with his sperm; or use artificial insemination by donor (AID), in vitro fertilisation (IVF), or another form of assisted reproduction. And if a man wants to adopt a child, the laws are the same.

It can be seen from the range of reproductive activities that I have described that many of them involve a decision that may offend some members of the community, especially those concerning contraception and abortion. Also, they may all affect people other than those directly concerned. In my case,

To say that there are no laws affecting these activities is somewhat misleading. Even if they are not specifically regulated by legislation, there are laws that regulate them incidentally. Hospitals and day care centres, for example, are required to provide safe premises and properly trained staff. Health professionals are required by the law of contract and negligence to take reasonable care in looking after their patients. This includes providing sufficient information to patients about medical procedures to enable them to make informed decisions about them. And there are rules for determining who has responsibility for looking after children and maintaining them financially. These laws apply however the child is conceived.

Areas specifically regulated

There are two areas related to reproduction, however, where the law specifically regulates the circumstances in which an activity may be undertaken. One is adoption, where there are laws limiting the people who are able to adopt a child.5 In Victoria, you have to be married,6 within a certain age bracket,7 have a 'good background'8 and be socially and economically able to look after the child.9 A formal process is also set out for vetting prospective parents.10   Relinquishing parents must have counselling.11 Many people are excluded and you cannot adopt a child unless you follow the rules.

The purpose of these laws is obviously to protect the child12 - to ensure that the child goes to a good home and will be well cared for. Note that adoption is different from the other procedures mentioned earlier in that it deals with a child who is already in existence - the question is what should be done to achieve the best outcome for a living child. There are parallels with the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) which also applies the standard of the 'best interests of the child' in deciding issues concerning the welfare of children after the breakdown of a marriage.13

The other activity that is governed by specific legislation in some jurisdictions is IVF (and other forms of assisted reproduction). As with adoption, people cannot engage in this activity unless they follow the rules. Consider the constraints imposed by the Victorian legislation on IVF (the Infertility Treatment Act 1995), for example. Initially, applicants had to be married: s 8(1)(b). After legal challenges by couples in de facto relationships,14 this was extended to include couples in a stable de facto relationship,15 but single and non-heterosexual people were excluded. Later, that limitation was challenged and single women were allowed access to IVF;16 but, in Victoria, the issue of same-sex couples has not arisen before the courts.17 It may be that single women will be admitted only if they meet the other criteria for admission, especially being infertile; and that may mean medically, not 'socially', infertile.18 If that is so, women who have not tried to become pregnant in the 'usual' way, by sexual intercourse with a male partner, may not qualify unless they have a physical condition that is proof of 'medical infertility'.19 Given the uncertainties in this area, it is not surprising that the Victorian Law Reform Commission has a Reference on Assisted reproductive technology and adoption: social, ethical and legal issues regarding 'eligibility criteria', which requires the Commission to make recommendations about expanding eligibility criteria for assisted reproductive technology and adoption.20

There are many other statutory requirements before one can undertake IVF:

Reasons for regulating IVF and other ART procedures

The policy reasons for this legislation are multi-faceted. Parts are to promote the best interests of the child, like adoption laws. Applicants had to be married (or in a stable de facto relationship) because it was assumed that a child would have a happier life in the "ideal family" of heterosexual married parents and child/ren. As noted earlier, the initial requirement in Victoria was de jure marriage.26 That requirement was imposed because of the general assumption that parents who are married to each other are more likely to stay married, creating a stable environment for the child; though various studies suggest that married couples may not, in fact, be much more likely to stay together than de facto ones.

The central registration of details of births from IVF may also provide important information for the child, both non-identifying and identifying. Under the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic), identifying information will be available to children when they reach the age of 18: s 79(1)(b). Counselling is required before identifying information is given (s 80(2)(a)) and the Authority must make reasonable efforts to advise the donor and suggest counselling for the donor: s 80(2)(b)(i)-(ii).27   Identifying information will also be available to donors (s 76(1)(b)), provided the child (or the parents if the child is under 18) consents (s 77(2)(a)(i),(ii)) and the counselling requirements are met: s 77(2)(c). The obligation of the state to provide this information, which is not available to children conceived in other ways, perhaps arises from the state being involved directly in reproductive technology.

Other provisions are directed to ensuring children are properly supported financially. Couples using IVF to have children are irrebuttably presumed to be the child's parents for all legal purposes;28 and 'social fathers' could not adduce evidence to show that they were not the biological father29 and thereby evade responsibility for maintaining the child. But that is not peculiar to IVF - any child born to a woman in wedlock is presumed to the child of her husband,30 though that may be rebutted;31 and federal child support legislation now requires men to support children they have fathered.32

Other parts of IVF legislation are intended to promote the health of the parents. The reasons for requiring full information and counselling about what to expect in IVF - and consent from both parties - are largely directed to this. Indeed, they reflect what one would expect in caring for the health of the prospective parents (it is difficult to differentiate between information giving and counselling; although the latter has a more 'therapeutic' aspect, there must be a lot of overlap).

But perhaps the main aim of IVF legislation is to control conduct that is morally suspect. These attitudes remain today. Take the 'mystery of birth' statements of theologian Dr Rosalie Hudson, responding to a paper of mine on access to ART:

The Christian understanding of creation is the union of male and female. The result of this union is a gift not a product ... a child is not a product of human will, nor is a child the outcome of a personal project whose meaning and destiny we determine33 ... There is mystery, uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the gift of procreation. Hence, the subtle but profound distinction between procreation and reproduction. Procreation entails a world given in grace by the Creator. Reproduction is the language of the machine and the factory, the language of gross national product.34

And there are the 'family values' arguments that were voiced particularly after the McBain case. The Prime Minister, John Howard, for example, is reported to have said:

This issue primarily involves the fundamental right of a child within our society to have the reasonable expectation, other things being equal, of the care and affection of both a mother and a father.35

A similar view was expressed by Justice Chesterman in a recent Queensland case refusing a woman leave to remove sperm from her deceased husband for later use in ART:

I cannot see how it can be said that the interests of [a child who has been conceived after the father's death] will be advanced by inevitable fatherlessness. The very nature of the conception may cause the child embarrassment or more serious emotional problems as it grows up. More significant, because the court can never know in what circumstances the child may be born and brought up, it is impossible to know what is in its best interests.36

There are 'selfishness' arguments - women are putting their own yearning for a child above the child's need for a father; economic arguments - single mothers can't support a child properly, or the limited resources of the state would be better spent on other types of treatment; and the argument of some feminists that women don't need children to 'complete' them.

Dr Germaine Greer, for example, is reported to have said recently, when criticising a British government plan to provide free fertility treatment to women:

Children bring at least as much pain as joy, they are born not to play roles in their parents' lives, but to live their own. ...It would be better medicine, and more merciful, to try to dispel the illusion that a child is necessary to an individual's happiness so as to spare her the protracted ordeal of fertility treatment.37

Do we need laws like the Victorian Infertility Treatment Act?

The 1984 Victorian Act, the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, was the first in the world and was what one might call a 'criminal model'. It created a number of new offences, for commission of which a person faced a term of imprisonment up to four years. (This was dubbed 'white coat crime'!) Thus a doctor who admitted an unmarried woman to an IVF program - or who proceeded without obtaining written consent from both parties - in fact committed an offence under the Act, although no one was ever prosecuted. Also, as Professor Max Charlesworth (a former member of the Standing Review and Advisory Committee on Infertility established by the Act) remarked, the legislation was also enabling. IVF was permissible if the statutory conditions were observed.

In other jurisdictions, (South Australia,38 Western Australia39 and the United Kingdom40) a 'licensing model' was adopted. In order to do IVF, an institution had to be licensed41 and a condition of the licence was that the parties be married42 or stable de factos,43 and written consent was obtained from both.44 This is essentially a 'civil' model. The penalty for non-compliance is forfeiture of the licence rather than a fine or imprisonment. But there is still a criminal 'backstop' in the penalty for operating without a licence.45 The 1995 Victorian Act also adopts a licensing approach, with a series of different licences or 'approvals' for different people and procedures.46

The third type of regulation is the one in the Australian non-statutory jurisdictions. It is not true that there is no law on IVF in those jurisdictions. The law that applies is the same as the law that applies to all doctor-patient consultations - the duty to take reasonable care in contract and negligence. This law is supplemented by guidelines such as the Demack report in Queensland47 and the Australia-wide guidelines of the National Health and Medical Research Council (currently under review48) and the Fertility Society of Australia. Although 'voluntary', these provide a standard which may be considered in deciding what is reasonable care in a given case. In this way, they are indirectly enforceable in contract, negligence and disciplinary proceedings. Alternatively, a statutory body could be established with broad powers to advise government on issues arising from time to time in reproductive technology and to develop and oversee a code of practice or licensing system, which is in effect a form of delegated legislation. The New South Wales Law Reform Commission recommended a scheme of this kind in 198849 but it was not adopted.

It can be seen from this discussion that many reproductive procedures are not regulated specifically and even with IVF, some jurisdictions have no specific legislation. The question arises whether we really need to have laws on IVF, except to provide for children born from donated gametes (who, in any event, are covered by separate legislation).50 In Victoria, the legislation on IVF has become more, rather than less, rigorous. This is especially the case with the provisions on embryo research, which is virtually prohibited by the 1995 Act.51 The Act is complicated and difficult to understand. Whenever legislation attempts to cover all imaginable circumstances (especially in a field of rapid discoveries), it inevitably trips over its own shoelaces. More and more additions and qualifications are needed, as it grows like Topsy. Look at the Income Tax Assessment Act!

Inc considering whether we really we need this type of legislation, remember that New South Wales seems to fare well without it! And, in Victoria, AID was offered for many years without the regulatory machinery it is now subject to under the 1995 Victorian Act (quite consistently with IVF as the issues of access to information are similar whenever donors are involved). Although people may seek treatment in less regulated jurisdictions (like the Victorian couples going to clinics in the Australian Capital Territory for IVF surrogacy),52 that is onerous and expensive for those involved. It is also inequitable as the benefit of treatment elsewhere is available only to those who can afford to travel.

To return to my original comparisons, is IVF so different from other 'reproductive' procedures that it needs to be specially regulated? Are the people who are concerned about IVF more concerned about it, for example, than contraception and abortion? Would it not make more sense to identify matters on which laws are needed for legal reasons (and we have these already in the Status of Children Acts and the Family Law Act) or where there is real community concern - and prohibit or regulate those? (The latter might include cloning, perhaps, though the concern about cloning may be less than has been suggested in the press53; or allowing an embryo to develop longer than a certain period; or commercial surrogacy.54) So much is said about the state's involvement in IVF - but what does it really mean? Is the state any less involved in surgery to reverse a tubal ligation or to remove a blockage from a woman's fallopian tubes?

Conclusion

In conclusion therefore, there do seem to be inconsistencies in the application of the laws on IVF and other reproductive technologies in Victoria to some reproductive activities and not to others. If I engage in unprotected group sex and conceive a child from mixed semen in my body, I commit no offence, however unwise my conduct. If I am participating in an IVF program it is an offence for a doctor to inseminate me with the semen of more than one man. If I (or my partner) engage in multiple relationships and the paternity of our child is later in issue, the putative child has no legal right to find out who is the 'real' father. But if I have used the facilities of the state and donor gametes to achieve a pregnancy, then the child does have that right. Throughout the regulatory field, decisions must be made about what conduct should be subject to punishment and whose rights need special legal protection. It is not surprising that this leads to results that someone appear inconsistent and even surprising!

NOTES

1 Professor Skene is a Professor of Law in the Faculty of Law and an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences at the University of Melbourne. She is Program Director of the Medical Ethics Program of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE) at Charles Sturt University and the University of Melbourne; and Deputy Director of the Centre for Law and Genetics at the University of Tasmania and the University of Melbourne. The early part of this paper is based on L Skene, 'Why legislate on assisted reproduction?' in Controversies in Health Law, ed I Freckelton; K Petersen,. Federation Press, Melbourne: pp 266-274 (1999). The paper was also the basis for the Lesbia Harford Oration, delivered by the author in Melbourne in 2003.

2 Throughout Australia, the criminal codes in all jurisdictions except the Australian Capital Territory continue to recognise the concept of unlawful abortion: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 82, 83; Criminal Code Act (NT) 1983 ss 172, 173, 174; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) ss 224, 225, 226 and 282; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 81, 82, 82A; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 51, 134, 135, 164; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 65, 66; Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss 199, 259, 268-9 and Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334. See Natasha Cica, Research Paper 1, 1998-99 Abortion Law in Australia Laws and Bills Digest Group, 31 Aug 1998: www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1998-99/99rp01.htm; Loane Skene, Law and Medical Practice, Butterworths, Sydney, 2nd ed (in press) ch 12.

4 Consent of the mother to an abortion is sufficient authority for the doctor to perform it (provided it is lawful). Consent is not needed from the father of the child and he has no legal right to prevent an abortion being performed, even if there is a doubt about whether it is lawful in the circumstances. In Attorney-General (Queensland) (ex rel Kerr) v T [1983] 1 Qd R 404; (1983) 46 ALR 285 (HCA) and F v F (1989) FLC 92-03, biological fathers were refused injunctions to prevent abortions being carried out

4 Before birth, the child is protected by the criminal law on abortion and child destruction; see Skene, note 3 above. In the early stages of pregnancy, the mother's wishes are paramount. The English Court of Appeal, on 7 May 1998, confirmed earlier judicial decisions in England (and also in some American States) that a pregnant woman is entitled to refuse medical intervention even if her unborn child is at risk: R v Collins; ex parte S [1998] 3 All ER 673. See also, M Boyle (2003) 29 (4) Journal of Medical Ethics; and my response (in press).

5 For example, Adoption Act 1984 (Vic); Adoption Regulations 1998 (Vic).

6 Adoption Act 1984 (Vic) s 11(1)(a); married for not less than two years; includes traditional Aboriginal marriages and de factos: s 11(1)(b)-(d). The court may make an adoption order in favour of one person where special circumstances exist: s 11(3). The Family Court can also make adoption orders in favour of married or de facto spouses of a parent (Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60D(1) and 60G) but step-parent adoption is not available to same sex couples.

7 Adoption Act 1984 (Vic) s 13(1)(a): at least 18 years; s 13(1)(b): at least 18 years older than the child; s 13(1)(c): not more than 40 years older than a child under 10; s 13(1)(d): not more than 45 years older than a child who has attained the age of 10.

8 Adoption Regulations 1998 (Vic) regs 14, 35.

9 Adoption Regulations 1998 (Vic) reg 35.

10 Adoption Act 1984 (Vic) s 15(1)(a); Adoption Regulations 1998 (Vic) reg 35.

11 Adoption Act 1984 (Vic) s 35(1)(a).

12 Section 9 of the Adoption Act states that the welfare and interests of the child are the paramount consideration.

13 For example, s 63F(2): court may vary child welfare provisions in a parenting plan if it considers the variation in the best interests of the child; s 68F: how a court determines what is in a child's best interest. The history of the notion of the best interests of the child being the "paramount consideration" is given in the looseleaf commentary on the Act [s 68F(5)] Australian Family Law, Vol 1, Legislation (Butterworths, 1997).

14 In Pearce v South Australia Health Commission (1996) 66 SASR 486, the South Australian Supreme Court ruled that reproductive technology legislation seeking to limit infertility services to heterosexual married women breached the Sex Discrimination Act. In MW, DD, TA & AB v Royal Women's Hospital [1997] HREOC 6, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission held that the defendant Victorian hospitals had unlawfully discriminated against unmarried couples in IVF programs.

15 Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) s 3; definition of "husband", "wife" and "spouse" includes de facto spouses (defined as living together on a genuine domestic basis though not married).

16 McBain v State of Victoria [2000] FCA 1009 (28 July 2000); Federal and State cases and legislation are available at www.austlii.edu.au; discussed by Kristen Walker, '1950s Family values v human rights: In vitro fertilisation, donor insemination and sexuality in Victoria' (2000) 11 Public Law Review 1, at 6-8; L. Skene, 'Voices in the ART [Assisted Reproductive Technology] debate' (2001) 20 (1) Monash Bioethics Review 9-23. A later appeal to the High Court by the Church was unsuccessful. Simon Evans and Stephen Donoghue neatly summarise the findings in the High Court Appeal in a post script to their article, 'Standing to raise constitutional issues in Australia'; in Gabriel Moens and Rodolphe Biffot, The Consequence of Legal Systems in the 21st Century - An Australian Approach, CopyRight, Brisbane, 2002, 107.

17 Compare JM v QFG & GK [1998] QCA 228 (QCA), in which a Queensland lesbian failed in a claim alleging indirect discrimination in being refused access to an infertility program.

18 Premier Bracks was reported to have 'reaffirmed his belief that IVF should be available for infertile women and 'not for those who choose it for social reasons or for their own life-style choices': Michael Gordon and Darrin Farrant, 'Howard sparks IVF storm', The Age, 2 Aug 2000. Later, the Infertility Treatment Authority (ITA) advised treatment agencies to offer ART only to medically infertile single or lesbian women: Infertility Treatment Authority Newsletter (Aug 2000).

19 Compare Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) s 8(3): persons who may undergo treatment procedures.

20 Terms of Reference. The proposed reference is extensive and includes many of the issues in this paper, including the best interests of the child; and 'the effects of the arrangements and agreements made by people who are having children without the assistance of licensed infertility clinics but who are not conceiving by sexual intercourse': ibid.

21 The statutory requirement for consent by a spouse must be read in the light of Sundberg J's judgment in McBain, note 16 above; under that judgment the Act is invalid to the extent that it excludes unmarried women from access to IVF in Victoria on the ground of their marital status.  

22 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 (HCA).

23 Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) ss 10, 21; Infertility Treatment Regulations 1997 (Vic).

24 With the exception in s 45 that animal ova may be mixed with human sperm where prescribed by the Regulations and carried out for diagnostic purposes only.

25 This is distinct from the prohibited procedures in Pt 5 of the Act in that the Authority is prohibited from approving this type of research and it is an offence to conduct research without approval from the Authority

26 Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984 (Vic) ss 10(3)(a), 11(3)(a), 12(3)(a), 13(3)(a); 13A(3)(a). Although ss 3(2)(a) and 3(2)(b) refer to de facto spouses, they are limited to couples who were living together when the Act came into effect: s 3(2)(a), (b). See too Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) s 3 which was later amended to include de factos: see note 15 above.

27 The Authority may waive the requirement for counselling: s 81.

28 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60H; Status of Children Act 1984 (Vic) ss 10A- 10E.

29 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60H; Status of Children Act 1984 (Vic) ss 10A-10E.

30 For example, Status of Children Act 1984 (Vic) s 5.

31 Status of Children Act 1984 (Vic) s 5 ("in the absence of evidence to the contrary").

32 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) ; Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth).

33 Rosalie Hudson, "The fragility of human rights: Response to Professor Loane Skene's paper `The right to reproduce'", Centre for Christianity and Society, Armadale Uniting Church, 26 Oct 2000; citing G Meilander "Begetting and cloning" ((June/July 1997) First Things 41-43, her emphasis.

34 Ibid.

35 Gordon and Farrant, n 7 above, p 1. This is similar to Principle 6 of the International Declaration on the Rights of the Child which states that a child "shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents".

36 In the matter of Gray [2000] QSC 390 (12 Oct 2000), para 23.

37 Christine Sams and Maria Hawthorne, "Women with baby obsession unstable: Greer", Sunday Age 3 Dec 2000, 1.

38 Reproductive Technology Act 1988 (SA); Reproductive Technology (Code of Ethical Clinical Practice) Regulations 1995 (SA).

39 Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA).

40 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK).

41 For example, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 3; Sch 2 outlines terms, conditions of licences: ss 12-15; s 15, research licences.

42 For example, Reproductive Technology Act 1988 (SA) s 13(4): heterosexual married and de facto couples (must have been together at least five years); Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) s 23(c): heterosexual couples who are married or have co-habited for at least five of the six previous years. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) does not specifically address the entitlement to gain access to treatment services but s 13(5) provides that a woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child for a father).

43 Above n 36.

44 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) Sch 3, para 1, donors and recipients; United Kingdom Code of Practice, Annex C:2 standard consent forms are set out; Reproductive Technology (Code of Ethical Clinical Practice) Regulations 1995 (SA) regs 15(1)-(3), 16, 23; Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) ss 22, 33(2)(d)-(e).

45 Reproductive Technology Act 1988 (SA) s 13(1) penalty a fine (summary. offence), s 15(1) suspension, cancellation; Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) s 6 fine, imprisonment or both.

46 For example, Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) ss 93, 94: licence required by institutions carrying out treatment procedures; storage of gametes, embryos, zygotes; s 101: licence required by research person carrying out treatment procedures or research; s 103: counsellors must be approved. Activities authorised by a licence are specified in the licence: s 97(3).

47 Report of the Special Committee Appointed by the Queensland Government to Enquire into the Laws Relating to Artificial Insemination, In Vitro Fertilization and Other Related Matters (1984), Vol 1.

48 The NHMRC Australian Health Ethics Committee released new draft Ethical Guidelines on the use off reproductive technology in clinical practice and research for public consultation on Feb 2003.

49 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report No 58, Artificial Conception, In Vitro Fertilization, pp 48-49 (the body was to be called the New South Wales Biomedical Council and would have been accompanied by a licensing system).

50 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60H; Status of Children Act 1984 (Vic) SS l0A-10E. Even States that do not have legislation on IVF have legislation providing that children born from donated gametes in IVF and related procedures are legally the children of the social parents. Such legislation was advocated by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General as early as 1980, well before the first IVF legislation in Victoria (the 1984 Act): Waller Committee, Report on Donor Gametes in IVF (August 1983), pp 33-35.

51 Approved research may only be undertaken on an egg in the process for fertilisation and must stop at syngamy: ss 24-26.

52 Milburn, C "Childless Turn to ACT Clinic", The Age, 21 May 1998.

53 Human cloning has been prohibited by legislation in several jurisdictions including Victoria, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is also covered by the ban on germ cell gene therapy in the National Health and Medical Research Council's Statement on Human Experimentation, Supplementary Note 7. However, most panellists in a recent Compass program on ABC television ("The Cloning Debate", 10 May 1998) were inclined to take a more liberal view. A recent discussion paper of the Human Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAC) in the United Kingdom invited submissions on potential medical and scientific benefits of cloning as well as its ethical implications: HGAC, Cloning Issues in Reproduction Science and Medicine (January 1998); www.doh.gov.uk/hgac/papers/papers_c.htm.

54 Even jurisdictions that have not legislated on lVF have legislated to regulate surrogacy; eg, the Surrogacy Parenthood Act 1988 (Qld); Substitute Parent Agreements Act 1994 (ACT).

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